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LABOR RELATIONS
AND TRIBAL SELF-GOVERNANCE
WENONAT. SINGEL*

INTRODUCTION
On May 28, 2004, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or "the
Board") reversed thirty years of precedent when it applied a new test to
determine whether the San Manuel Indian Bingo and Casino, a triballyowned casino located on reservation land, was subject to the NLRB's
jurisdiction under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).' Until the
Board issued its opinion, tribes were able to conduct their affairs on
reservation lands knowing that labor concerns were governed by tribal law,
without interference from the federal government. Now, on-reservation
tribal activities are no longer immune from the purview of federal labor
law, and tribes are forced to regroup and determine whether the Board's
confusing and subjective test will subject their activities to the NLRA.
The application of the NLRA to tribes is also significant because it
marks the growing application of the judicially-created Tuscarora-Coeur
d'Alene approach. 2 This hybrid analytical framework has never been
reviewed by the United States Supreme Court, yet six courts of appeals and
the NLRB have adopted it to support determinations that federal employment statutes of general applicability apply to Indian tribes, unless the law
"touches exclusive rights of self-government in purely intramural matters"
or would abrogate treaty rights, or unless there is proof in the legislative
3
history that Congress did not intend the law to apply to tribes.

*Visiting Assistant Professor, University of North Dakota School of Law. Appellate Judge
and Member, Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians. J.D., Harvard Law School; A.B.,

Harvard College. Thank you to Tiffany Johnson, Katrina Turman, Doug Murch, and Marah
DeMeule of the North Dakota Law Review for their assistance. I also wish to thank Matthew
L.M. Fletcher for his constant encouragement.
1. San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino, 341 NLRB No. 138, 2004 WL 1283584, at *1 (May
28, 2004).
2. See generally William Buffalo & Kevin J. Wadzinski, Application of Federal and State
Labor and Employment Laws to Indian Tribal Employers, 25 U. MEMPHIS L. REV. 1365, 1379
(1995) (describing the creation of the Tuscarora-Coeurd'Alene approach, citing Federal Power
Commission v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99 (1960), and Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene
Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113 (9th Cir. 1985)).
3. See EEOC v. Karuk Tribe Housing Auth., 260 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2001); Fla. Paraplegic
Ass'n, Inc. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla., 166 F.3d 1126 (11 th Cir. 1999); Reich v.
Mashantucket Sand & Gravel, 95 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 1996); EEOC v. Fond du Lac Heavy Equip. &
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In opposition to these courts of appeals, the Tenth Circuit applies an
analysis rooted in recognition of tribal inherent sovereignty and reserved
rights. 4 Under this analysis, the court acknowledges Congress's plenary
power over Indian affairs, yet refrains from concluding that a statute works
as a divestment of tribal sovereignty unless Congress has clearly expressed
5
an intent to do so.
The difference in these competing modes of analysis represents a
fundamental conflict in how the courts construe tribal sovereignty. For
some, the hallmark of sovereignty is its inherent nature, and any
diminishment of sovereignty or abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity
requires an explicit expression of Congress, with ambiguities construed
against the backdrop of the Indian canon of construction. 6 For others, the
hallmark of sovereignty is the doctrine of implicit divestiture. 7 From this
approach, the courts are untethered from the foundational principles of
federal Indian law and Congressional statements on Indian sovereignty and
are free to make their own assessments of whether sovereignty is consistent
with particularized circumstances.
This article argues that the San Manuel decision and the TuscaroraCoeur d'Alene line of cases adopt the wrong approach to determine whether
federal statutes of general applicability that are silent as to tribes effectively
divest tribes of their sovereign powers. Part I describes the Board's
decision in the San Manuel Indian Bingo and Casino matter. Part II
discusses how the Board's analysis departs from the foundational principles
of federal Indian law, the Indian canon of construction, and even the
Supreme Court's developing implicit divestiture doctrine, leading the Board
to apply an overly-restrictive, subjective test that minimizes sovereignty
and ignores congressional policy. Part III describes the NLRA and argues
that Congress did not intend for it to divest tribes of their sovereign powers.
Part IV proposes strategies that tribes can adopt to continue to assert tribal
sovereignty in labor relations.

Const. Co., Inc., 986 F.2d 246 (8th Cir. 1993); Smart v. State Farm Ins. Co., 868 F.2d 929 (7th
Cir. 1989); NLRB v. Navajo Tribe, 288 F.2d 162 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
4. E.g., NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan, 276 F.3d 1186 (10th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
5. See id. at 1195.
6. See generally Ralph W. Johnson & Berrie Martinis, Chief Justice Rehnquist and the
Indian Cases, 16 PUB. LAND L. REV. 1,5-7 (1995).

7. Id.
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THE DECISION TO ASSERT JURISDICTION OVER THE SAN
MANUEL

The San Manuel Band of Serrano Mission Indians is a federally
recognized Indian tribe with a reservation located in San Bernardino
County, California. 8 The Tribe owns a 100,000 square-foot gaming operation on reservation lands and employs over 1,700 Indian and non-Indian
employees at the facility. 9 The facility provides an essential stream of revenues, all of which are used to fund government services such as water and
sewer, road construction, educational services, housing, and job training.10
On June 28, 2003, the Tribe entered into a collective bargaining
agreement with Communication Workers of America (CWA) pursuant to an
employee election held in accordance with the Tribe's labor relations
ordinance." The agreement governed employment matters such as wages,
seniority, vacation time, sick leave, holidays, grievances, training, and
health and safety matters. 12
In 1998 and 1999, separate complaints were filed with the NLRB
against the Tribe's casino alleging that the casino violated the NLRA by
rendering aid, assistance, and support to the CWA by allowing CWA agents
access to the casino facility while denying similar access to agents of
another union, the Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees International
Union (HERE).13 The tribe moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction,
arguing that NLRA did not govern its on-reservation activities. 14
The Board held that the NLRA applied to the Tribe's gaming operations, and as a result, it concluded that it did indeed have jurisdiction to
review the merits of the complaint.15 The Board reached its conclusion in
two steps. First, it reassessed earlier NLRB precedent that had established
that Tribes and their enterprises were exempt from the NLRA's definition
of employer.16 Section 2(2) of the NLRA provides that the definition of
"employer" does not include "[t]he United States or any wholly owned
Government corporation, or any Federal Reserve Bank, or any state or
political subdivision thereof, or any person subject to the Railway Labor
8. San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino, 341 NLRB 138, 2004 WL 1283584, at *1 (May 28,
2004).
9. San Manuel Band of Mission Indians website, Economic Diversification, at
http:www.sanmanuel-nsn.gov/economic.php (last visited Feb. 12, 2005).
10. San Manuel, 2004 WL 1283584, at * 1I (Schaumber, dissenting).
11.San Manuel Band of Mission Indians website, supra note 9.
12. Id.
13. San Manuel, 2004 WL 1283584, at *1.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at *3.
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(other than when acting as an

employer), ..."17 In earlier cases, the Board had concluded that tribal
enterprises operating on reservation lands were "governmental entities" that
qualified as "political subdivisions" and were therefore excluded from the
definition of "employer."1 8 The Board justified its reversal by explaining
that the text of the NLRA never supported an exemption for tribal
enterprises, but the Board had been willing to apply the exemption to Tribes
by analogizing them to the NLRA's reference to political subdivisions of
States. 19 In San Manuel, the Board emphasized that, in its opinion, this
analogy was not only unsupported by Supreme Court precedent, 20 but also
counter to the principle that exceptions to the NLRA must be narrowly
construed. 2 1
The Board then reviewed whether "federal Indian policy" provided a
basis for exempting the casino from the NLRA.22 Here the Board's reasoning represents a fundamental shift in its theory of tribal sovereignty
under federal law. Prior to San Manuel, the Board had affirmed that tribes
are free from outside intervention unless specifically authorized by Congress. For example, in Fort Apache it had pronounced that "[i]t is clear that
individual Indians and Indian tribal governments, at least on reservation
lands, are generally free from state or even in most instances Federal
23
intervention, unless Congress has specifically provided to the contrary."
With San Manuel, the Board adopted a completely contrary rationale. This
rationale begins from the premise that all federal statutes of general
application are presumed to apply to Indian tribes unless the statute touches
a tribe's exclusive rights of self-government in purely intramural affairs,

17. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1998).
18. See Fort Apache Timber Co., 226 NLRB 503 (1976) (Fort Apache) (finding that tribal
mining company located on Indian land was a "governmental entity" and therefore not an
employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act); see also S. Indian Health Council, 290
NLRB 436 (1988) (Southern Indian) (holding that a nonprofit health care clinic operated on a
reservation and the consortium of seven Indian tribes that operated the clinic were "governmental
entities" excluded from the definition of "employer" under the NLRA).
19. San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino, 341 NLRB 138, 2004 WL 1283584, at *4 (May 28,
2004).
20. Id. at *6; see also White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 (1980);
Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Blackfeet Tribe, 924 F.2d 899, 905 (9th Cir. 1991), overruled on other

grounds Big Horn County Elec. Coop. v. Adams, 219 F.3d 944 (9th Cir. 2000); Smart v. State
Farm Ins. Co., 868 F.2d 929, 936 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Barquin, 799 F.2d 619, 621
(10th Cir. 1986).
21. San Manuel, 2004 WL 1283584, at *1; see also L.A. County Museum of Art v. NLRB,
688 F.2d 1278, 1282 (9th Cir. 1982).

22. San Manuel, 2004 WL 1283584, at *7.
23. Fort Apache Timber Co., 226 NLRB at 506.
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abrogates a treaty right, or can be deemed to exempt tribes on the basis of
24
the act's language or legislative history.
The Board relied on the Supreme Court's 1960 decision in Federal
Power Commission v. Tuscarora Indian Nation25 for the premise that
statutes of "general application" apply to the conduct and operations of
Indian tribes. 26 In Tuscarora,the Court held that the Federal Power Act
(FPA) applied to Indian land as well as non-Indian land, thereby allowing
the Tuscarora Indian Nation's land to be taken for a hydroelectric power
project.27 In its analysis, the Court stated, "a general statute in terms
28
applying to all persons includes Indians and their property interests."
In support of its reliance on Tuscarora as authority for San Manuel, the
Board points to a line of cases from the Second, Seventh, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals that have used Tuscarora as the starting
point for determining whether other federal employment laws apply to
tribal activities.2 9 Notably, however, each of the circuits that have relied on
Tuscarora in the federal employment context have found that the opinion's
blanket statement regarding general statutes and their application to Indians
conflicts with other established principles of federal Indian law. Rather
than dispense with using the case as precedent for extending federal
employment statutes to tribal employers, however, these courts have
identified three exceptions to the rule. 30
The Ninth Circuit first identified three exceptions to Tuscarora's rule
in United States v. Farris.31 That case involved the application of a federal
criminal statute to individual tribal members. In 1985, the Ninth Circuit
reiterated these three exceptions in a case involving the application of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act to a tribally-owned farm. In this
opinion, Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm,32 the court observed that
statutes of general applicability should not be applied to the conduct of

24. San Manuel, 2004 WL 1283584, at *7-*8.
25. 362 U.S. 99 (1960).
26. Tuscarora, 362 U.S. 116 (1960).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See Fla. Paraplegic, Ass'n. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla., 166 F.3d 1126, 112930 (11 th Cir. 1999) (ADA); Reich v. Mashantucket Sand & Gravel, 95 F.3d 174, 177 (2d Cir.
1996) (OSHA); Smart v. State Farm Ins. Co., 868 F.2d 929, 932 (7th Cir. 1989) (ERISA);
Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 1985) (Coeur d'Alene)
(OSHA).
30. Id.
31. 624 F.2d 890, 893-94 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that the provision of Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970 proscribing gaming applied to individual Puyallup tribal members operating a
casino on reservation land).
32. 751 F.2d 1113 (9th Cir. 1985).
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Indian tribes if (1) the law "touches exclusive rights of self-government in
purely intramural matters," (2) the application of the law would abrogate
treaty rights, or (3) there is "proof' in the statutory language or legislative
history that Congress did not intend the law to apply to Indian tribes.33 The
general premise made in Tuscarora's holding as modified by Coeur
d'Alene's recognition of three exceptions has since been referred to as the
Tuscarora-Coeurd'Alene approach.
Though this is the first time the Board has applied the TuscaroraCoeur d'Alene approach to a tribe's on-reservation conduct, the Board is no
stranger to this line of cases. Prior to San Manuel, the Board applied
Tuscarora and Coeur d'Alene to off-reservation tribal activities. 34 This
practice began twelve years earlier in Sac & Fox, when the Board reviewed
whether the NLRA applied to an off-reservation tribal manufacturing
business. 35 The Board determined in Sac & Fox that the Fort Apache and
Southern Indian precedents were distinguishable because in those cases, the
Board stressed that the tribal activity in question was occurring on
reservation land. 36 In such on-reservation instances, the Board found that
the assertion of jurisdiction "would interfere with the tribes' powers of
internal sovereignty." 37 With Sac & Fox's off-reservation operation, the
Board concluded that the conduct was distinguishable and therefore did not
qualify under the "political subdivision" exemption from the NLRA.38
Once the Board freed Sac & Fox's conduct from the "political subdivision"
exemption, it applied Tuscarora and Coeur d'Alene and concluded that the
Board had jurisdiction over the activity. 39
Applying Tuscarora-Coeur D'Alene to San Manuel, the Board
determined that there was no barrier to the assertion of jurisdiction.4 0 The
Board held that the NLRA is a statute of general applicability, and that none
of the exceptions provided in Coeur d'Alene applied.4 1 It found that no
treaty would be abrogated by assertion of jurisdiction under the NLRA and
no legislative history existed that indicated that Congress intended to

33. Coeur d'Alene, 751 F.2d at 1115; see also Mashantucket Sand & Gravel, 95 F.3d at 177;
Smart, 868 F.2d at 932-933.
34. Sac and Fox Industries, Ltd., 307 NLRB 241 (1992).
35. Id. at 242.
36. Id. at 242-43.
37. Id. (citing Fort Apache Timber Co., 226 NLRB 503, 505-06 (1976) and S. Indian Health
Council, 290 NLRB 436, 437 (1988)).
38. Id. at 245.
39. Id. at 242-43.
40. San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino, 341 NLRB 138, 2004 WL 1283584, at *9 (May 28,
2004).
41. Id.
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42 The Board also considered
exclude tribes from the NLRA's application.
whether assertion of jurisdiction would "touch exclusive rights of selfgovernance in purely intramural matters," and it concluded that it would
not.43 It held that "intramural matters" include matters such as "tribal
44 It distinguished
membership, inheritance rules, and domestic relations."
such matters from the casino, which it described as "a typical commercial
enterprise operating in, and substantially affecting, interstate commerce ...
45 As a result, the
[with] employees [who] are not members of the tribe."
Board concluded that "the tribe's operation of the casino is not an exercise
of self-governance,"46 and it therefore did not fit into Coeur d'Alene's first
exception making it subject to the Act.

II.

THE BOARD'S DEPARTURE FROM SUPREME COURT
PRECEDENT
A. THE BOARD'S FAILURE TO

RECOGNIZE FOUNDATIONAL TENETS

OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW

The Board's decision that the NLRA applies to the San Manuel Band's
on-reservation casino operation is problematic for several reasons. At the
outset, the decision fails to recognize the foundational principles of federal
Indian law, and as a result, its analysis is unmoored from a deeply-rooted
judicial tradition that affords a certain respect for tribal self-government and
defers to the exercise of congressional power.
The Board's analysis does open with a quote from Felix Cohen, that
"Indian tribes consistently have been recognized ...by the United States as
'distinct, independent political communities' qualified to exercise powers of
self-government, not by virtue of any delegation of powers, but rather by
47 The Board also quotes the
reason of their original tribal sovereignty."
Supreme Court's decision in McClanahan v. State Tax Commission of
Arizona 48 for the principle that tribal sovereignty predates that of the
49
Federal government.

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

2004)

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at * 14.
Id. at *3 (quoting FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, 232 (1982)).
411 U.S. 164(1973).
San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino, 341 NLRB 138, 2004 WL 1283584, at *3 (May 28,

(citing McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 172).
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The Board's nod to Felix Cohen omits several important principles that
describe the place of Indian tribes in the federal system. These principles,
first articulated by Chief Justice John Marshall in the Marshall trilogy, 50 are
derived from the nation's historic relationship with Indian tribes and the
references made to tribes in the Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution.51 The cases of the Marshall trilogy are widely recognized as
insightful descriptions of the Framers' understanding of the relationship
between the federal government and Indian tribes because their author,
Justice Marshall, was a contemporary of the Framers of the Constitution
and was knowledgeable of the debates regarding the status of Indian
tribes. 52
In the first case of the Marshall trilogy, Johnson v. Mclntosh,53 Justice
Marshall concluded that upon "discovery," the rights of Indian tribes to
complete sovereignty were "necessarily diminished,"54 and that the tribes
had lost their capacity to make treaties or enter into land transactions with
any sovereign other than the discovering nation. 55 In Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia,56 Marshall explained that although tribes were not equivalent to
foreign nations, the Cherokee Nation remained "as a state, as a distinct
political society, separated from others, capable of managing its own affairs
and governing itself."57 Tribes are "domestic dependent nations," 58 and
their relationship to the United States "resembles that of a ward to its
guardian."59
In the third case of the trilogy, Worcester v. Georgia,60 Marshall
affirmed that the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution vested
sole authority to manage Indian affairs in the Congress.61 Congress's
power in this arena precluded the assertion of state authority over Indian

50. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S.
(5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
51. The Constitution provides that Congress shall have the power to regulate commerce
"with the Indian Tribes," U.S. CONST. art. I, §
8, cl.
3.
52. David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court's Pursuitof States' Rights,
Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267, 270 (2001); see also
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 70 (1996) (describing Chief Justice John Marshall along
with Madison and Hamilton as "three influential Framers").
53. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1832).
54. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 574.
55. Id. at 573.
56. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
57. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 16.
58. Id. at 17.
59. Id.
60. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
61. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 538.
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tribes. 62 Furthermore, Congress's authority to manage Indian affairs was
63
not aimed at the destruction of tribal sovereignty. Rather, the relationship
between the tribes and the federal government was "that of a nation claiming and receiving the protection of one more powerful: not that of individuals abandoning their national character, and submitting as subjects to the
64
laws of a master."
Marshall's references to Congress's power to manage Indian affairs
and his references to the guardian-ward relationship between tribes and the
United States became the Supreme Court's first articulation of the plenary
power doctrine and the federal trust responsibility. Marshall also understood that the political authority of Indian tribes is an inherent sovereignty
65
He also explained that treaties between the
predating the United States.

federal government and Indian tribes served to cede pre-existing tribal
66 Marshall's analysis of the Cherokee
rights and expressly retain others.
Nation's treaties with the United States also led him to explain that unless
entered into a treaty,
Congress acted through legislation or the executive
67
tribes retained their inherent sovereign rights.
The Marshall trilogy ultimately gave rise to the Indian canon of
construction. The Indian canon is an approach to the interpretation of
treaties and statutes affecting Indian rights that gives special consideration
for the retained rights and inherent sovereignty of tribes and for the trust
68
relationship between tribes and the federal government. In County of
69
Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Nation, the Supreme

62. Id.at 561.
63. See id. at 555.
64. id.
65. Id. at 559 (describing the Indian nations as "distinct, independent political communities,
retaining their natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time immemorial").
66. Id. at 553-54.
67. Id. at 561. According to Marshall,
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community occupying its own territory, with
boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and
which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent of the
Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with acts of Congress.
Id.
68. David M. Blurton, Canons of Construction, Stare Decisis and Dependent Indian
Communities: A Test of Judicial Integrity, 16 ALASKA L. REV. 37, 41 (1999) (noting that
Worcester v. Georgia is generally accepted as the genesis of the canons of construction for federal
Indian law); see also County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 247 (1985) ("Itlhe
canons of construction applicable in Indian law are rooted in the unique trust relationship between
the United States and the Indians"); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143
(1980) ("traditional notions of Indian self-government are so deeply engrained in our
jurisprudence that they have provided an important 'backdrop' against which vague or ambiguous
federal enactments must always be measured") (citation omitted).
69. 502 U.S. 251 (1992).
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Court stated that "[w]hen we are faced with.., two possible constructions
[of a statute], our choice between them must be dictated by a principle
deeply rooted in [the United States Supreme] Court's Indian jurisprudence:
'[s]tatutes are to be construed liberally in favor of Indians, with ambiguous
provisions interpreted to their benefit.'70 This canon of construction has
been applied in several cases to prevent ambiguous statutes from creating
an implied diminishment of tribal rights.71 The Indian canon of construction also counsels that tribal self-governance rights should be upheld unless
Congress has made its intent to abridge them "unmistakably clear." 72
Over time, the principles established in Marshall's opinions have been
repeatedly cited as guideposts in the field of Indian law. 73 Through the
mid-1980s, the cases were consistently invoked. 74 Although today's
Supreme Court rarely recites the Marshall cases, they have not been overruled,75 and their presence and affirmation in nearly 150 years of decisions
has left an indelible mark on Indian law jurisprudence.76 Similarly,
although the canons of construction have played a less prominent role in the

Rehnquist Court's jurisprudence,77 they have not been overruled and
continue to provide critical elements of Indian law opinions. 78

70. Yakima Nation, 502 U.S. at 269 (quoting Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 766
(1985)).
71. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978); Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S.
373 (1976); United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 354 (1941) (finding that statute
creating Colorado River Reservation did not extinguish tribe's aboriginal title and rights to
ancestral lands); Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665,675-76, 678 (1912).
72. COHEN, supra note 47, at 283 ("congressional intent to override particular Indian rights
[must] be clear"); see also Yakima Nation, 502 U.S. at 258 ("[O]ur cases reveal a consistent
practice of declining to find that Congress has authorized state taxation unless it has 'made its
intention to do so unmistakably clear."') (citation omitted); California v. Cabazon Band of
Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 215 n.17 (1987); County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470
U.S. 226, 247-48 (1985).
73. Getches, supra note 52, at 272.
74. Id. at 272.
75. But see Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 361 (2001) (noting that the Court has long
departed from the notion in Worcester v. Georgia that "the laws of [a State] can have no force"
within reservation boundaries).
76. Id. at 274.
77. Judith V. Royster, Of Surplus Lands and Landfills: The Case of the Yankton Sioux, 43
S.D. L. REV. 283, 307 (1998) ("The Court will recite the canons, state that they apply, and then
interpret the treaty or statute at issue to find that no ambiguity exists."). In Chickasaw Nation v.
United States, 534 U.S. 84, 95 (2001), the Court also determined that the canon that assumes
Congress intends its statutes to benefit the Indian tribes may be offset by the canon that warns
against interpreting statutes as providing tax exemptions unless those exemptions are clearly
expressed.
78. Pourier v. S.D. Dept. of Revenue, 658 N.W.2d 395, 399 (S.D. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S.
Ct. 2400 (2004) (affirming that the Indian canon forms the necessary background to consideration
of whether the Hayden-Cartwright Act permits state tax of on-reservation fuel sales from Indianowned corporation to tribal members).
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In stark contrast to an approach that recognizes that the foundational
principles of federal Indian law have actual legal import, the Board in San
Manuel depicts federal Indian law as a policy that it may choose to apply or
ignore. 79 The Board's description of the legal status of tribes within the
federal system as a "policy" rather than "law" is a pernicious attempt to
diminish the legal status of Indian tribes to a mere value of the "legal
80
culture" that should be weighed against competing values. Policies do not
mandate legal outcomes, they merely articulate broad goals.
The Board also does more than simply mischaracterize federal Indian
law as a "policy." To the extent its analysis hinges on "policy," it has the
policy wrong. The Board's discussion of federal Indian policy is limited to
a selective reference to federal case law and a statement that tribal commer8
cial activities do not implicate the special attributes of tribal sovereignty. 1
Neither of the principle cases addressed by the Board affirm past or present
82 Similarly, Congress
congressional statements of federal Indian policy.
has never pronounced a policy that tribal sovereignty does not extend to
tribal commercial activities. On the contrary, the current congressional
and
policy toward Indian tribes promotes tribal self-determination
83
aim.
this
to
essential
recognizes that economic development is
79. San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino, 341 NLRB 138, 2004 WL 1283584, at *2 (May 28,
2004) ("This case requires the board to accommodate Federal labor policy and Federal Indian
policy in deciding whether to assert jurisdiction, under the Act, over tribal enterprises."); id. at *7
("Having determined that the Act does not preclude the Board's assertion of jurisdiction over the
Respondent, we next address whether Federal Indian policy requires that the Board decline
jurisdiction."); id. at *12. Further,
[blecause application of the Tuscarora-Coeur d'Alene standard poses no impediment
to the assertion of the Board's jurisdiction, the final step in the Board's analysis is to
determine whether policy considerations militate in favor of or against the assertion of
the Board's discretionary jurisdiction. Our purpose in undertaking this additional
analytical step is to balance the Board's interest in effectuating the policies of the Act
with its desire to accommodate the unique status of Indians in our society and legal
culture.
Id.
80. See id.
81. Id. at *8.
82. See Fed. Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 123-24 (1960)
(finding that tribally-owned fee lands were subject to condemnation under the Federal Power Act);
Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding that OSHA
applied to a tribally-owned farm).
83. For example, the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act states that its purpose is "to provide a
statutory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means of promoting tribal
economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments." 25 U.S.C. §2702(1)
(2000). The Indian Financing Act of 1974 states,
It is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress ... to help develop and utilize Indian
resources, both physical and human, to a point where the Indians will fully exercise
responsibility for the utilization and management of their own resources and where
they will enjoy a standard of living from their own productive efforts comparable to
that enjoyed by non-Indians in neighboring communities.
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Ultimately, the Board's failure to recognize the foundational principles
of federal Indian law and its failure to apply the Indian canon of statutory
construction led it to adopt an analysis that is unhinged from a full understanding of the place of Indian tribes in the federal system and the trust
relationship between the federal government and Indian tribes. The Board's
analysis, which consists of the adoption of the Tuscarora-Coeur d'Alene

approach and the determination that the approach does not preclude the
Board's assertion of jurisdiction over San Manuel's gaming operation,
trivializes sovereignty, as dissenting Board member Peter Schaumber aptly
described.84

What follows is a review of the problems inherent in the Board's
application of Tuscarora and Coeur d'Alene. Also discussed is why this
rule represents the turning of federal Indian law on its head because it
replaces the foundational principles of federal Indian law with the
understanding that the true hallmark of federal Indian law is the concept of

implicit divestiture. 85 Finally, if the federal courts continue to apply this
approach, they will progressively confine the concept of tribal sovereignty
to a narrow, meaningless scope.
B.

THE BOARD'S MISGUIDED RELIANCE ON THE "TUSCARORA-COEUR
D 'ALENE APPROACH"

1.

Reliance on Tuscarora's Dictum

In its analysis, the Board's decision follows the misguided lead of five
courts of appeals which have held that Federal Power Commission v.
Tuscarora Indian Nation86 is the seminal case on whether statutes of

general application apply to Indian tribes. 87 In reality, the language relied
Id. § 1451. The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, and the Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934, have similar purposes. Id. § 450, Id. § 461.
84. San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino, 341 NLRB 138, 2004 WL 1283584, at *19 (May
28, 2004).
85. See infra notes 144 to 153 and accompanying text.
86. 362 U.S. 99(1960).
87. Reich v. Mashantucket Sand & Gravel, 95 F.3d 174, 177 (2d Cir. 1996) (applying
Tuscarora to conclude that OSHA governed a tribal construction company); EEOC v. Fond du
Lac Heavy Equip. & Constr. Co., 986 F.2d 246, 248 (8th Cir. 1993) (applying Tuscarora's
general rule but finding that the ADEA did not apply because it would interfere with the tribe's
right of self-government); Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir.
1985) (applying Tuscarora in opinion concluding that OSHA governed activities of triballyowned farm); Fla. Paraplegic, Assoc. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 166 F.3d 1126, 1129-30
(11 th Cir. 1999) (applying Tuscarora to find that Title III of the ADA applies td Indian tribes);
Navajo Tribe v. NLRB, 288 F.2d 162, 165 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 928 (1961)
(applying Tuscarora to conclude that the NLRA is applicable to a non-Indian uranium mill on the
Navajo reservation). In Smart v. State Farm Insurance Co., the Seventh Circuit applied
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upon in Tuscarora consists of decontextualized dictum which the federal
courts have seized as justification for a massive effort to minimize tribal
sovereignty.
The question before the Supreme Court in the Tuscarora case dealt
with whether fee lands owned by the Tuscarora Nation could be condemned
88
under the FPA to make way for a storage reservoir for a power project.
The FPA permitted the taking of land generally, but excepted lands
constituting "reservations" where the taking would "interfere with or be
inconsistent with the purpose for which such reservation was created or
acquired." 89 The Court found that the Tuscarora Nation's fee lands were
not "reservations" because they did not meet the NLRA's definition, which
90
required that the lands be owned by the United States.
Upon finding that the FPA did not exempt the fee lands on its face, the
Court considered whether the taking of the lands violated the long-standing
principle that "General Acts of Congress did not apply to Indians, unless so
91
expressed as to clearly manifest an intention to include them." The Court
considered the fact that its own more recent precedent had determined that a
tax law applicable to persons generally is also applicable to individual
Indians. 92 As a result, the Court decided to apply the FPA to the Indianowned fee lands, stating "it is now well settled by many decisions of this
Court that a general statute in terms applying to all persons includes Indians
93
and their property interests."

Numerous federal courts and commentators have criticized
Tuscarora'sdictum. 94 Many criticize the Court's adoption of the dictum as
Tuscarora to find that ERISA governed a group policy provided to a tribal employer. Smart v.
State Farm Ins. Co., 868 F.2d 929, 938 (7th Cir. 1989). But four years later, in Reich v. Great
Lakes Indian Fish & Wildlife Commission, the Seventh Circuit's Judge Posner ignored Tuscarora
and applied principles of comity and the Indian canon of construction to find that the FLSA did
not apply to the Commission. Reich v. Great Lakes Indian Fish & Wildlife Comm'n, 4 F.3d 490
(7th Cir. 1993).
88. Fed. Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 100 (1960).
89. Id. at 107-11 (quoting 16 U.S.C. 797(e) (2001)).
90. Id. at 110-14.
91. Id. at 115-16 (quoting Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94,99-100 (1884)).
92. Id. at 116 (citing Superintendent of Five Civilized Tribes v. Comm'r, 295 U.S. 418
(1935); Okla. Tax Comm'n v. United States, 319 U.S. 598 (1943)).
93. Id.
94. NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan, 266 F.3d 1186, 1199 (10th Cir. 2002) (en banc); Reich v.
Mashantucket Sand & Gravel, 95 F.3d 174, 177 (2d Cir. 1996); EEOC v. Cherokee Nation, 871
F.2d 937, 938 n.3 (10th Cir. 1989); Multimedia Games, Inc. v. WLGC Acquisition Corp., 214 F.
Supp. 2d 1131, 1135-36 (N.D. Okla. 2001); see also COHEN, supra note 47, at 284; Vicki J.
Limas, Application of Federal Labor & Employment Statutes to Native American Tribes:
Respecting Sovereignty and Achieving Consistency, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 681, 696-99 (1994); Alex
Tallchief Skibine, Applicability of Federal Laws of General Application to Indian Tribes and
Reservation Indians, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 85, 105-07 (1991); Maureen M. Crough, Comment,
A Proposal for the Extension of the Occupational Safety and Health Act to Indian-Owned
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a general rule because the case did not involve the potential impairment of
tribal sovereignty. 95 Since the case dealt with an attempt to condemn fee
lands rather than reservation lands, its holding is relevant for the rights of
Indians as individuals rather than as governments. There is no evidence
that the Tuscarora Nation raised, nor did the Court consider, whether the
FPA would apply if it impaired the self-governance rights of the Tuscarora
Nation. 96
Ironically, in a discussion about whether a statutory restraint on
alienation of Indian lands operates to prevent the federal government from
making conveyances without a treaty or convention as required by the
statute, the Tuscarora Court identified the test for determining whether a
statute validly impairs rights of self-government. 97 It explained that
"[t]here is an old and well-known rule that statutes which in general terms
divest pre-existing rights or privileges will not be applied to the sovereign
without express words to that effect."98 It is conceivable that the Court
would have relied on this rule had the case dealt with tribal sovereignty
rights. Nineteen years earlier, the Court had spoken out against the implied
diminishment of Indian rights, citing the Indian canon against implied
repeals. 99 The Court stated that "[a]n extinguishment cannot be lightly
implied in view of the avowed solicitude of the Federal Government for the
welfare of its Indian wards."10o Two years earlier, this principle was
reaffirmed in Williams v. Lee.1Ol In addition, the Supreme Court's rulings
Businesses on Reservations, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM., 473, 486-87 (1985); Judith Royster &
Rory SnowArrow Faussett, Control of the Reservation Environment: Tribal Primacy, Federal
Delegation and the Limits of State Intrusion,64 WASH. L. REV. 581, 591 (1989).
95. See Pueblo of San Juan, 266 F.3d at 1199 ("The Tuscarora Court's remarks concerning
statutes of general applicability were made in the context of property rights, and do not constitute
a holding as to tribal sovereign authority to govern."); Buffalo & Wadzinski, supra note 2, at 1393
("The Tuscarora rule of general applicability does not address tribal self-governance and tribal
sovereign immunity because those issues were not involved in the formation of the rule.");
Crough, supra note 94, at 486-87 ("The Tuscarora rule's expansive reading of the original case's
dictum is unjustified because tribal sovereignty was not at issue in the cases on which the dictum
is based .... "); Royster & SnowArrow, supra note 94, at 591.
96. In support of its statement on statutes of general application, the Court also relied on case
law that dealt with the rights of individual Indians. See Superintendent of Five Civilized Tribes,
295 U.S. at 421 (applying federal income taxes to individual Indians); Oklahoma Tax Comm'n,
319 U.S. at 612 (applying state taxes to individual Indians).
97. Fed. Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 120 (1960) (quoting
United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 272-73 (1947)).
98. Id.
99. Blurton, supra note 68, at 43-44 (quoting United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314
U.S. 339 (1941)).
100. Id.
101. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 221 (1958) (concluding that a clear statement of
congressional intent was necessary to allow state civil or criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian
reservation activity).
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after Tuscarora belie the proposition that the case introduced a new rule
that allowed congressional silence to effectively diminish tribal sovereignty.
In Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States,102 the Court cautioned that
federal statutes should not be used as a "backhanded way of abrogating...
rights of these Indians." 103 In the case of United States v. Wheeler,104 the
Court clarified how the rule against implied repeals of tribal rights coexists
with the principle first expressed in Johnson v. McIntosh that Indian tribes
lost their complete sovereignty upon discovery.10 5 The Court explained,
The sovereignty that the Indian tribes retain is of a unique and
limited character. It exists only at the sufferance of Congress and
is subject to complete defeasance. But until Congress acts, the
tribes retain their existing sovereign powers. In sum, Indian tribes
still possess those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty
or statute, or by implication as a necessary result of their
dependent status.1 06
As Wheeler makes clear, the sovereign rights of tribes in the modem era
may be diminished by implication only to the extent necessary as a result of
their dependent status. 107 In all other cases, Congress must clearly act to
limit tribal rights.108 This rule, though providing for some limited implied
repeal of tribal rights, is still significantly more protective of tribal rights
than the dictum of Tuscarora.
Others criticize the elevation of Tuscarora'sdictum into a general rule
for statutory construction because the statute involved was arguably not a
statute of general applicability itself.109 Unlike a statute of general
applicability which is silent regarding tribes, the FPA had specific
provisions to accommodate tribal rights.l10 The statute provided that if the
lands sought to be taken were part of a "reservation," then the lands could
not be condemned unless the Federal Power Commission determined that
the taking would not interfere with or be inconsistent with the purpose for
102. 391 U.S. 404 (1968).
103. Blurton, supra note 68, at 44 (quoting Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States,
391 U.S. 404 (1968)).
104. 435 U.S. 313 (1977).
105. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323
106. Id. at 323 (emphasis added).
107. See infra notes 144-153 and accompanying text for a fuller discussion of tribal rights
and implicit divestiture.
108. See FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 122 (1942) (Univ. of New

Mexico Press 1971).
109. Skibine, supra note 94, at 104-05 ("Tuscarorainvolved neither Indians within an Indian
reservation nor a general law that was silent with respect to its application to Indians."); Limas,
supra note 94, at 698.
110. 16 U.S.C. §§ 796(2), 797(e) (2000).
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which the reservation was created."' Since the FPA squarely dealt with
tribal rights and was not a true statute of general application, its dictum on
statutes of general application lacks salience.
2.

Reliance on Coeur d'Alene's Synthesis

A further mistake of the Board in San Manuel is its reliance on
Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm1 l2 as the federal courts' best
attempt to create a coherent framework from several lines of authority on
the applicability of general federal statutes to Indian tribes. In Coeur
d'Alene, the Ninth Circuit accepted the statement in Tuscarorathat it is
"now well settled by many decisions of this Court that a general statute in
terms applying to all persons includes Indians and their property interests,"
but it identified three specific exceptions. 113 The first provides that statutes
of general application which are silent regarding tribes will not apply if "the
law touches 'exclusive rights of self-governance in purely intramural
affairs."'l4 The second provides that the statute will not apply if "the
application of the law to the tribe would 'abrogate rights guaranteed by
Indian treaties."' 1 1 5 The third prevents application if "there is proof by
legislative history or some other means that Congress intended (the law] not
to apply to Indians on their reservations.... ."116 The court held that when
any of these three situations are met, "Congress must expressly apply a
statute to Indians before we will hold that it reaches them."1 17
By affirming Tuscarora's rule and asserting that deviations from it
constitute exceptions rather than proof of its invalidity, Coeur d'Alene
establishes a rebuttable presumption stacked against tribal interests.
Although the presumption involves instances where a statute should not
apply, it still places the burden on tribal parties to prove that their conduct
fits an exception. The presumption also leads to the inference, adopted by
many courts, that the exceptions must be narrowly interpreted to prevent
them from "swallowing the rule."118 Since the Tuscarora dictum did not
arise from a reasoned analysis that addressed tribal self-governance, and
111. Id.
112. 751 F.2d 1113 (9th Cir. 1985).
113. Coeurd'Alene, 751 F.2d at 1115-16.
114. Id. at 1116 (quoting United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890, 893-94 (9th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1111 (1981) (finding that the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 applied to
prohibit individual Puyallup tribal members from operating a casino on tribal lands)).
115. Id.

116. Id.
117. Id.

118. Id.; Reich v. Mashantucket Sand & Gravel, 95 F.3d 174, 179 (2d Cir. 1996); Smart v.
State Farm Ins. Co., 868 F.2d 929, 935 (7th Cir. 1989).
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since it does not articulate a rule that comports with Supreme Court
precedent establishing the Indian canon of construction, Coeur d'Alene is
wrong to establish Tuscarora as a hurdle that tribes must overcome.
A second problem inherent in Coeur d'Alene's analysis is its attempt to
cabin the exceptions to Tuscarora to only three examples. The exceptions
identified in Coeur d'Alene, adopted from the Ninth Circuit's opinion in
United States v. Farris, merely constituted precedents that appeared to
deviate from Tuscarora'sdictum.119 Neither the Farris court nor any of its
authorities claimed that the universe of possible exceptions to Tuscarora
had been exhausted. Given time, the courts may have identified new
examples of deviances from Tuscarora, or they may have formed a more
coherent analysis that provided a more unified approach.
a.

The FirstException: When the Law Touches on "Exclusive
Rights of Self-Governance in Purely IntramuralMatters"

Coeur d'Alene provides that Tuscarora does not apply when "the law
touches on 'exclusive rights of self-governance in purely intramural
matters."' 120 This standard has been widely criticized as subjective,
trivializing tribal sovereignty, ignorant of tribal government institutions,
and inconsistent with the Supreme Court's authority on the powers of tribal
self-government. 121
i.

The First Exception Lacks a Rational Tie to Supreme
Court Precedent

First, the standard for Coeur d'Alene's first exception forms an
inappropriate test because it departs from the Supreme Court's case law on
tribal political authority and from congressional policy in Indian affairs.
The principle cases that the Farris court relied upon in forming this
standard were the Supreme Court's opinion in Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez122 and the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Arizona ex rel. Merrill v.
Turtle. 123 Neither of these cases stood for the proposition that Indian tribes
are generally subject to federal statutes of general application outside

119. Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 1985) (quoting
United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890, 893 (9th Cir. 1980)).
120. Id.
121. E.g., Buffalo & Wadzinski, supra note 2, at 1392-96; Limas, supra note 94, at 740-46;
Skibine, supra note 94, at 139.
122. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
123. 413 F.2d 683 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1003 (1970).
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"exclusive rights of self-governance in purely intramural matters."1 24 In
Martinez, the Supreme Court considered whether the sovereign immunity
of the Santa Clara Pueblo barred a female member from suing it under the
Indian Civil Rights Act.125 In its analysis, the Court examined the nature of
tribal political authority. 126 It explained,
Indian tribes are "distinct, independent political communities,
retaining their original natural rights" in matters of local selfgovernment .... Although no longer possessed of the full
attributes of sovereignty, they remain a "separate people, with the
power of regulating their internal and social relations." . . . They
have the power to make their own substantive law in internal
matters and to enforce that law in their own forums. 127
The Court's description of tribal sovereignty in Martinez compiled
statements made in earlier Supreme Court opinions, such as Worcester v.
Georgia and United States v. Wheeler.l2 8 The inclusion of this language in
the opinion affirmed the Santa Clara Pueblo's authority to interpret the
Indian Civil Rights Act in its own forum and in accordance with its own
interpretative powers and cultural values. The Court used this language to
justify its decision to respect tribal sovereignty and bar a tribal member
from suing the tribe in federal court. Accordingly, this language is merely a
positive assertion of the tribe's legal authority. The attempt by the Farris
court and Coeur d'Alene court to mold this language into a restrictive
description of the boundaries of tribal political authority is unjustified.
Other than a recognition later in the opinion that Congress has the plenary
power to limit or modify the power of self-government, including the power
to waive tribal sovereign immunity through an "unequivocal expression" of
"legislative intent," Martinez' description of tribal authority does not mark
the boundaries of tribal sovereignty in an attempt to encapsulate a defined
safe zone beyond which general federal statutes can freely effect implied
repeals of sovereign rights.
Furthermore, the precise language of the Martinez decision differs from
the Farrisand Coeur d'Alene decisions in a small, yet important respect:
whereas Martinez provided a positive affirmation of tribes' authority to
regulate "their internal and social relations," 129 Farris and Coeur d'Alene
124. Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 1985) (quoting
United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890, 893 (9th Cir. 1980)).
125. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 51-52.

126. Id. at 55-56.
127. Id. (omitting internal citations).
128. Id.

129. Id. at 55.
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delimited the scope of conduct which is immune from statutes of general
130
application that are silent as to tribes to "purely intramural matters."
Assuming that "internal" and "social" have separate meanings, Martinez'
reference to the tribal power to regulate "social relations" affirmed some
form of tribal authority beyond internal matters to include dealings with
nonmembers. Yet neither Farris nor Coeur d'Alene acknowledged this
"social" element of tribal political authority over external relations. Thus,
Coeur d'Alene's description truncates the meaning of Martinez to create the
foundation for a hyper-limited standard for tribal sovereignty. To the extent
the Coeur d'Alene court carves out an exception from Tuscarora for
"exclusive rights of self-governance in purely intramural matters," the
Court departs from the very case law that it identifies as its support. 13 1
The Farris and Coeur d'Alene decisions also limit the potential
meaning of the first exception to Tuscarora by repeating the mantra that
tribal membership, inheritance rules, and domestic relations are the hallmarks of the sort of tribal conduct that is presumed to be governed
exclusively by the tribe unless Congress clearly expresses an intent to abrogate tribal sovereign rights.132 These examples are lifted from Martinez,
which offered them as three examples of tribal authority to make substantive law.133 Like the three exceptions to Tuscarora, the examples of
tribal membership, inheritance rules, and domestic relations did not exhaust
the potential matters of tribal self-government. Yet their inclusion as apt
examples has served as a gatekeeper, decreasing the possibility that tribes
will successfully argue for a more expansive interpretation of the sort of
conduct which is presumed exempt from general statutes that are silent as to
tribes. 134
The Farris court also relied upon the Ninth Circuit's opinion in
Arizona ex rel. Merrill v. Turtle to support its articulation of the first

130. United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890, 893 (9th Cir. 1980); Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene
Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 1985).
131. See id.
132. Farris,624 F.2d at 893 (citing as examples Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49
(1978) (membership); Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1 (1899) (inheritance rules); United States v.
Quiver, 241 U.S. 602 (1916) (domestic relations)); Coeur d'Alene, 751 F.2d at 1116 ("We believe
that the tribal self-government exception is designed to except purely intramural matters such as
conditions of tribal membership, inheritance rules, and domestic relations from the general rule
that otherwise applicable federal statutes apply to Indian tribes.").
133. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 55-56.
134. San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino, 341 NLRB 138, 2004 WL 1283584, at *9 (May
28, 2004) ("Intramural matters generally involve topics such as 'tribal membership, inheritance
rules, and domestic relations"'); Reich v. Mashantucket Sand & Gravel, 95 F.3d 174, 179 (2d Cir.
1996) (same).
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exception to Tuscarora.135 However, this opinion, like Martinez, is a
positive affirmation of tribal self-government. The case affirmed that
Arizona had no authority to extradite a Cheyenne resident of the Navajo
reservation. 136 The case cites Williams v. Lee's statement that
"[e]ssentially, absent governing Acts of Congress, the question has always
been whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to
make their own laws and be ruled by them."13 7 In sum, the Merrill case
does not serve as a proper description of the outer limits of tribal authority.
Assuming Tuscarora'sblanket statement that general statutes apply to
Indians and their property interests was valid, a more legally consistent
description of the exception for tribal self-government would track the
Supreme Court's doctrine of implicit divestment. Since application of the
first exception to the Tuscarora-Coeurd'Alene rule requires consideration
of the boundary between the zone of tribal conduct where federal
enactments are not presumed to apply and the zone of conduct where they
are, it makes more sense to draw from a doctrine that addresses the implied
limits of tribal powers to exercise self-government.
The Supreme Court began its fixation with implicit divestiture in
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,138 when it concluded that Indian tribes
no longer retain criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, despite the absence
of any congressional act or treaty supporting its finding.139 The Court
stated that "

. .

. Indian tribes are prohibited from exercising both those

powers of autonomous states that are expressly terminated by Congress and
those powers 'inconsistent with their status."' 140 Two weeks later, the
Court decided United States v. Wheeler, in which it held that tribal
prosecutions of members do not violate the double jeopardy clause because
the power to prosecute such crimes is inherent rather than derived from the
federal government.'14 In support of its conclusion that the sovereign
power to prosecute was not implicitly lost, the Court stated that "[t]he areas
in which such implicit divestiture of sovereignty has been held to have
occurred are those involving the relations between an Indian tribe and
nonmembers of the tribe."142 As a result, the Court explained, the Court

135. Farris,624 F.2d at 893 (citing Arizona ex rel. Merril v. Turtle, 413 F.2d 683, 685
(1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1003 (1970)).
136. Merrill, 413 F.2d at 685.
137. Id. at 684 (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959)).
138. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
139. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 208.
140. Id.
141. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 332-33 (1978).
142. Id. at 326.
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had long recognized that tribes no longer have the power to freely alienate
lands to non-Indians, they can no longer enter into direct relations with
143
foreign nations, and they can no longer try nonmembers in tribal courts.
In 1981, the Supreme Court revisited the doctrine of implicit
divestiture in Montana v. United States.'4 That case concluded that tribes
generally lack the authority to regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians
on non-Indian owned fee lands within a reservation. 145 It stated that the
"exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal selfgovernment or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the
dependent status of tribes, and so cannot survive without express congressional delegation."1 46 The Court, however, identified two exceptions to
its rule. 147 A tribe may regulate the activities of nonmembers who enter
consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, and a tribe may
exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands when
the conduct "threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity,
48
the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe."1
Following Montana, the Court decided a series of cases that narrowly
interpreted the Montana exceptions.149 The Court has also extended
Montana's analysis to tribal lands as well as non-Indian fee lands.150 The
cumulative effect of these decisions is that tribal civil jurisdiction over
nonmembers is limited to instances where the tribal interest is extremely
high or where the exercise of civil jurisdiction is rationally related to a
private consensual relationship between the tribe and nonmember.151
The Court's development of implicit divestiture shows that the limits of
tribal political authority are drawn where tribal relations with nonmembers
143. Id.
144. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
145. Montana, 450 U.S. at 544.
146. Id. at 564.
147. Id. at 565-66.
148. Id.
149. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Nation, 508 U.S. 679 (1993)
(rejecting tribal authority to zone all non-Indian lands within a reservation); Strate v. A-1
Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997) (rejecting tribal civil jurisdiction over car accidents that take
place on state-owned lands within a reservation); Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645
(2001) (rejecting tribal authority to tax non-Indian owners of land within a reservation); Nevada v.
Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001) (rejecting tribal civil jurisdiction over a state officer who enters tribal
land to enforce a search warrant).
150. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 364-65.
151. Joseph William Singer, Canons of Conquest: The Supreme Court's Attack on Tribal
Sovereignty, 37 NEw ENG. L. REV. 641, 652 (2003) ("The exception in Montana for economic
interests and political integrity has been interpreted exceedingly narrowly."); Atkinson Trading
Co., 532 U.S. at 656 (stating that Montana's consensual relationship exception requires that the
tribal regulation have a nexus to the consensual relationship); Hicks, 533 U.S. at 359 n.3
(interpreting the Montana reference to consensual relationships as private and not far removed).
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are concerned. It would be wrong to conclude that tribes lack the power of
self-government in all matters involving nonmembers, however. The
Montana Court's two exceptions were founded on a long history of the
recognition of tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers.152 This history, as
synthesized by Montana, creates a more appropriate substitute for Coeur
d'Alene's first exception to Tuscarora. The exception should therefore
provide that the Tuscarora presumption should never apply if the
application of the federal statute in question would interfere with the tribe's
self-government powers in internal matters. It should also provide that the
Tuscarora presumption should not apply if the application of the federal
statute in question would interfere with the tribe's self-government in
matters where it is exercising civil jurisdiction over nonmembers who are
engaged in conduct that threatens the tribe's political integrity, economic
security, or health or welfare, or who have formed a consensual relationship
with the tribe, and the nature of the consensual relationship is connected to
the exercise of jurisdiction. Under this standard, general federal labor laws
that are silent with respect to tribes should not presumptively apply in the
tribal context. This is because all tribal employment consists of a
consensual relationship between the tribal employer and employee, and the
tribal regulation of employment matters is directly connected to this
relationship.
In sum, the Ninth Circuit's first exception to the Tuscarora dictum is
not consistent with the Supreme Court's federal Indian law jurisprudence.
Rather than using Supreme Court precedent that describes the outer limits
of tribal political authority over non-members, the Coeur d'Alene and
Farris courts established a sui generis standard that diverges from
precedent and places artificial limits on tribal authority.
ii. The FirstException Invites Subjectivism
The first exception to Coeur d'Alene, which forces the court to
determine whether a law touches "exclusive rights of self-governance in
purely intramural matters," also invites an extreme form of subjective
jurisprudence.1 53 The case law currently available on this question is
sparse, relative to the large potential for the application of this standard to
myriad unique tribal circumstances. As a result, the courts lack objective
tests that adequately address how to resolve disputes under this prong.
Currently, the tests that the federal courts and the NLRB have fashioned are
152. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981).
153. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113 at 116 (citing U.S. v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890,
893-94 (9th Cir. 1980).
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either so limiting that they barely permit an exception to arise, or they are
so loosely defined that they fail to create a standard at all. The risk with
courts that interpret the test in an overly restrictive way is that they create
an insurmountable hurdle to the exercise of tribal sovereignty. For example, the Ninth Circuit applies this standard by looking to whether the
conduct in question is one of "those rare circumstances where the
immediate ramifications of the conduct are felt primarily within the
reservation by members of the tribe and where self-government is clearly
implicated." 5 4 Under this interpretation, any conduct that affects interstate
commerce or involves the employment of non-Indians is not deemed to
55
constitute a purely intramural matter or implicate tribal self-government.1
Alternatively, tests that fail to create an objective standard invite subjective
determinations that increase the opportunity for courts to impose their own
normative constructs onto tribes, forcing tribes to conform to the court's
vision of legitimate tribal self-government. The ambiguity inherent in this
exception to Tuscarora is most evident with the requirement that a general
56 The opinions that
statute touch "exclusive rights of self-governance."1
apply this standard have failed to interpret the meaning of this phrase, and
have instead made conclusory statements that the tribal operation of
businesses affecting interstate commerce are not essential to tribal self57
government. 1
In addition, if a tribal interest argues that the first exception applies, the
rebuttable presumption forces the tribal party to place the legitimacy of
tribal sovereignty on trial for a federal decision maker's review. As tribes
and other tribal interests attempt to show that the application of the law
would touch "exclusive rights of self-governance in purely intramural
matters," they are forced to submit the legitimacy of tribal governance to a
58 Since many
largely homogenous pool of non-Indians at the bench.1

154. Snyder v. Navajo Nation, 382 F.3d 892, 895 (9th Cir. 2004).
155. See id., NLRB v. Chapa De Indian Health Program, Inc., 316 F.3d 995, 999-1000 (9th
Cir. 2003); Reich v. Mashantucket Sand & Gravel, 95 F.3d 174, 180-81 (2d Cir. 1996); U.S. Dept.
of Labor v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 935 F.3d 182, 184 (9th Cir. 1991);
Fla. Paraplegic Ass'n, Inc. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla., 166 F.3d 1126, 1129 (1 1th Cir.
1999).
156. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113 at 116 (citing U.S. v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890,
893-94 (9th Cir. 1980).
157. See, e.g., Fla ParaplegicAss'n, 166 F.3d at 1129.
158. For example, in the San Manuel decision, the Board stated,
[wihen the Indian tribes [participate in the national economy in commercial
enterprises] the special attributes of their sovereignty are not implicated ....
[However,] at times, the tribes continue to act in a manner consistent with that mantle
of uniqueness. They do so primarily when they are fulfilling traditionally tribal or
governmental functions that are unique to their status as Indian tribes.
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judges and other tribunals such as the NLRB lack familiarity with tribal law
and tribal institutions of self-government, these arbiters are poorly equipped
to recognize when conduct in Indian Country implicates tribal selfgovernment interests. 159
iii. The FirstException Minimizes Sovereignty
The Board's use of the "exclusive rights of self-government in purely

intramural affairs" standard is also inappropriate because it minimizes and
trivializes tribal sovereignty. First, the "purely intramural" standard led the
Board to express doubt that tribal sovereignty is at stake when the San
Manuel Band engages in conduct involving non-Indians. As discussed
above, this presumption is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's opinions
on the scope of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians.160 Particularly in cases
involving consensual relationships with nonmembers, the Supreme Court
recognizes that tribes possess civil jurisdiction to regulate the conduct of
non-members as long as the regulation has a nexus with the nature of the
consensual relationship.16 1 The right to enact and enforce laws governing
the employment relationship satisfies this nexus requirement, since the laws
directly relate to the consensual employment relationship between tribal
employers and employees. Similarly, tribes possess jurisdiction to enforce
tribal employment laws against a non-Indian company employing nonIndians on the reservation, provided that the tribe or its members enter into
a consensual commercial agreement relating to employment. The existence
of tribal authority to regulate the employment relationship in these
circumstances underscores the fact that these relationships implicate tribal
self-government interests.
The Board's application of the "purely intramural" standard is also
troubling because it conceives of tribes as isolated units comprised
exclusively of members. In reality, non-members participate in nearly all
aspects of tribal life.162 They work as employees in both tribal business

San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino, 341 NLRB 138, 2004 WL 1283584, at *8 (May 28, 2004).
The Board did not explain how it might identify when a tribe fulfills its traditional tribal or
governmental functions.
159. Getches, supra note 52, at 276 ("Judges who are not steeped in the culture and values of
Indian tribalism are ill-equipped to rework these complex and anomalous traditions case by
case.")
160. See supra note 137 and text accompanying.
161. See Atkinson Trading v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 656 (2001).
162. See Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Of Native Americans and Tribal Members: The Impact
of Law on Indian Group Life, 28 L. & Soc. REV. 1123, 1128 (1994).
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enterprises and tribal government.16 3 They live in tribal housing with their
enrolled spouses, parents, or children.164 They participate in tribal com65
merce, stay as guests in tribal hotels, and travel through tribal lands.1 In
addition, in many tribes, non-members participate in tribal government by
serving as members of tribal boards, commissions, and judiciaries.166 If
more courts require the exclusive involvement of tribal members before
finding that tribal conduct is "purely intramural," the standard will rarely, if
ever, apply.
Second, the San Manuel decision expresses doubt that tribal
sovereignty rights are involved when a tribe operates a commercial
enterprise. The Board's perfunctory dismissal of the notion that commercial activities involve issues of sovereignty disregards the economic
reality of tribes, the tribal governance issues involved in commercial
conduct, and the prevailing congressional policy of the day.
It is widely recognized that Indian tribes are one of the most
67
impoverished groups in the country.1 In August 2004, the Census Bureau
reported that the poverty rate for American Indians is nearly double the
national average. 168 Tribal communities also suffer from high unemployment rates, high rates of insufficient and substandard housing, high suicide
69
rates, high rates of diabetes, and low rates of educational achievement.1 A
significant factor contributing to these statistics is the absence of healthy
170 Due to remoteness and lack of
economies on many tribal reservations.
economic development, many tribes lack a tax base to sufficiently pay for
needed governmental services. 17 1 Furthermore, reliance on federal funding
without independent sources of governmental revenues serves to prolong

163. See generally Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Tribal Employment Separation: Tribal Law
Enigma, Tribal Governance Paradox, and Tribal Court Conundrum, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
(forthcoming 2005).
164. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, United States v. Lara: Affirmation of Tribal Criminal
JurisdictionOver Nonmember American Indians, 83 MICH. B. J., July 2004, at 24, 25.
165. E.g., Yavapai-Prescott Indian Tribe v. Scott, 117 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1997).
166. E.g., Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians, Grand Traverse Band
Police Commission Ordinance (Jan. 11, 2000); Swinomish Tribe, Utilities Code, Tribal Utility
Authority Membership, 11-02.070 (Nov. 5, 2003); The Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde
Community of Oregon, Tribal Court Ordinance, Tribal Code § 310(e) (March 5, 2003).
167. See CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL, U.S CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND
HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2003 12 (Aug. 2004), available at

http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/p60-226.pdf.
168. See id.
169. See generally Fiscal 2006 Budget: Indian Affairs-Part 2, Before the Senate
Committee on Indian Affairs, 2005 WL 375968 (Feb. 15, 2005) (statement of Tex Hall, President
National Congress of American Indians).
170. See id.
171. See Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Hodel, 663 F. Supp. 1300, 1315 n.21 (D.D.C. 1987).
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economic dependence and stagnation. 72 Consequently, tribal involvement
in commercial activities is an essential governmental function for many
tribes.
The revenues produced by tribal businesses fund services as diverse as
utilities, including water, sewer, telecommunications and energy; health
care; natural resource management; elders programs; social services; tribal
court systems; law enforcement; tribal schools; and adult education. 73
Some fear that tribal commercial activities such as gaming result in large
windfalls for a few tribal members.174 However, the reality is that gaming
is not a cash cow for most tribes, and federal law imposes restrictions on
gaming revenues to ensure that the funds are used for governmental
services. 175
The Board is also wrong to dismiss the notion that tribal commercial
activities fail to raise issues of self-governance. The Board takes the position of several courts of appeals when it demarcates tribal governmental
activities from tribal commercial activities and presumes that selfgovernment interests are limited to the first. First, for the reasons discussed
above, tribal commercial activities are closely linked to governance because
they play an essential role in funding government services and energizing
tribal economies. Second, tribal commercial activities necessarily raise
issues of governance because tribes regulate every aspect of commercial
activity. Tribes govern the formation and maintenance of corporations,
commercial transactions, the employment relationship, conduct that affects
the environment, and land use. 176 Although the Supreme Court has
recognized restrictions on the extent of tribal civil jurisdiction, these
restrictions do not entirely prevent tribes from exercising political authority

over these matters. 177 As a result, tribal commercial activities are tightly
enmeshed in tribal self-governance decisions.

172. Cf. ERIC HENSON & JONATHAN B. TAYLOR, NATIVE AMERICA AT THE NEW

MILLENNIUM, 26-27 (2004) available at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/hpaied/pubs.pub004.htm.
173. See, e.g., Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians v. United States Att'y
for the W. Dist. of Mich., 198 F. Supp. 2d 920, 924 (W.D. Mich. 2002), aff'd, 369 F.3d 960 (6th
Cir. 2004).
174. See Kathryn R.L. Rand & Steven A. Light, Virtue or Vice?: How IGRA Shapes the
Politics of Native American Gaming, Sovereignty, and Identity, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 381,
430 (1998).
175. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(B).
176. See generally John F. Petoskey, Doing Business With Michigan Indian Tribes, 76 MICH.
B. J. 440 (1997).
177. See, e.g., Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Assiniboine & Sioux Tribes of the Fort
Peck Reservation, 323 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 2003) (remanding for consideration whether the tribe
had authority to regulate activities of non-Indian business conducting activities on tribal lands).
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The Board's determination that tribal commercial activities do not
invoke sovereignty concerns is also refuted by Congress's policy toward
tribes.178 As discussed above, Congress has expressly adopted a policy of
furthering tribal self-determination through enacting laws that foster
economic development.179 The Indian Financing Act of 1974 and the
Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act are just two
examples that "reflect Congress'[s] [sic] desire to promote the 'goal of
Indian self-government, including the 'overriding80 goal' of encouraging
tribal self-sufficiency and economic development."
Third, the language "exclusive rights of self-government in purely
intramural matters" trivializes tribal sovereignty because it lacks objectivity. 181 The only guidance that the Coeur d'Alene decision offers on its
meaning was its statement that membership, inheritance rights, and
domestic relations are included within its scope. Yet, as discussed earlier,
these subjects do not represent exhaustive compilations of the tribal
political authority. Many courts, however, approach their analysis of this
exception by searching for evidence that the conduct in question is related
1 82 In these cases, the courts apply the
to one of these three subject matters.
83
exception in an exceedingly minimizing way.1 Courts that do not apply
this limitation, however, are left without a full sense of the scope of self-

government activities that it might encompass. The result is that courts
apply their own subjective determinations on a case-by-case basis, deciding
in each particular factual situation whether the conduct in question appears
84
to relate to tribal sovereignty rights.1 This approach is also inappropriate
because it invites the courts to determine the essential ingredients of tribal
sovereignty on an ad hoc, "I know it when I see it" basis.
178. See, supra note 83 and accompanying text.
179. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 1451 (2000) (declaring policy of Congress to allow Indian tribes
to develop resources for economic development and self-government purposes).
180. Vicki J. Limas, Application of Federal Labor and Employment Statutes to Native
American Tribes: Respecting Sovereignty and Achieving Consistency, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 681, 693
(1994) (quoting Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 510
(1991)).
181. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113 at 116 (citing U.S. v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890,
893-94 (9th Cir. 1980).
182. E.g., NLRB v. Chapa De Indian Health Program, Inc., 316 F.3d 995,999-1000 (9th Cir.
2003); EEOC v. Karuk Tribe Hous. Auth., 260 F.3d 1071, 1079 (9th Cir. 2001); Fla. Paraplegic
Ass'n, Inc. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla., 166 F.3d 1126, 1129 (1 lth Cir. 1999); Reich v.
Mashantucket Sand & Gravel, 95 F.3d 174, 179 (2d Cir. 1996); Smart v. State Farm Ins. Co., 868
F.2d 929, 936 n. 5 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. White, 237 F.3d 170, 173 (2d Cir. 2001); U.S.
Dept. of Labor v. Occupational Safety & Health Comm'n, 935 F.2d 182, 184 (9th Cir. 1991).
183. E.g., Mashantucket Sand & Gravel, 95 F.3d at 179-82 (applying Occupational Health &
Safety Act to tribal business); OccupationalSafety & Health Comm'n, 935 F.2d at 184 (applying
rule to tribal mill even though "revenue from the mill is critical to the tribal government").
184. Snyder v. Navajo Nation, 382 F.3d 892, 895 (9th Cir. 2004).
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The Second Exception Selectively Adopts a Portionof the
Rule Against Implied Repeals

Coeur d'Alene also recognizes an exception to Tuscarora'spresumption in cases where application of the law would abrogate treaty rights.
This exception recognizes that "Congress does not intend to abrogate laws
guaranteed by Indian treaties when it passes general laws, unless it makes
specific reference to Indians." 185 This principle simply restates the Indian

canon of construction, that the courts "do not construe statutes as
abrogating treaty rights in a 'backhanded way'; in the absence of explicit

statement, 'the intention to abrogate or modify a treaty right is not to be
lightly imputed to the Congress."'186
Through the treaty rights exception, Coeur d'Alene and the Board in
San Manuel adopt the rule against implied repeals. However, both Coeur
d'Alene and San Manuel fail to recognize that the Supreme Court has
applied the rule against implied repeals in the absence of treaties as well.187
C.

THE BOARD'S DENIAL OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

Once the Board determined that it could assert jurisdiction over San

Manuel, it neglected that "[t]he fact that a statute applies to Indian tribes
does not mean that Congress abrogated tribal immunity in adopting it."188
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit has noted that "whether an Indian tribe is
subject to a statute and whether the tribe may be sued for violating the

statute are two entirely different questions."1 89 Thus, upon concluding that
the NLRA applied to the San Manuel's gaming operation, the Board was
required to consider as separate issue whether the tribe's sovereign
immunity had been waived by Congress or the tribe.
In general, where the application of a statute will abrogate tribal
sovereign immunity, such abrogation may not be implied.190 Rather, it
must be "unequivocally expressed" 191 in "explicit legislation."1 92 In the

recent case of Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies,

185. United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890, 893 (9th Cir. 1980).
186. United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 739 (1986) (quoting Menominee Tribe v. United
States, 391 U.S. 404, 413 (1968)).
187. See, e.g., Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976); United States v. Santa Fe Pac.
R.R., 314 U.S. 339 (1941).
188. Bassett v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 204 F.3d 343, 357 (2d Cir. 2000).
189. Fla. Paraplegic Ass'n v. Miccosukee Tribe, 166 F.3d 1126, 1130 (11 th Cir. 1999).
190. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 435 U.S. 49, 58 (1978).
191. Id. (quoting United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969)); see also United States v.
Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976).
192. Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751,759 (1998).
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Inc., 193 the Supreme Court upheld the vitality of tribal sovereign immunity
in off-reservation tribal commercial- activities.1 94 It noted that Congress
95 But absent a clear
could "alter its limits through explicit legislation."1
mandate from Congress, the Supreme Court refused to find that tribal
immunity was diminished.196 It noted, "Congress is in a position to weigh
and accommodate the competing policy concerns and reliance interests.
The capacity of the Legislative Branch to address the issue by compre197 In the case
hensive legislation counsels some caution by us in this area."
of San Manuel, the Board's assertion of jurisdiction under the NLRA
created the potential that the tribe would be subject to suit and penalized
with fines. Such actions, which would abrogate the tribe's sovereign
immunity, require a clear expression in explicit legislation. Since the
NLRA includes no such expression, the Board's assertion of jurisdiction
should be barred.
III. CONGRESS DID NOT INTEND FOR THE NLRA TO APPLY TO
TRIBES
Viewed from the perspective of the foundational principles of federal
Indian law and the Indian canon of construction, the language of the NLRA
does not support the conclusion that the NLRA applies to tribes and divests
them of their sovereign authority to govern tribal labor relations.
None of the NLRA's provisions specifically refer to tribes. Instead, it
vests jurisdiction in the NLRB over "employers," and the NLRA excludes
from the definition of employers "[t]he United States or any wholly owned
Government corporation, or any Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or
political subdivision thereof, or any person subject to the Railway Labor
Act ...

or any labor organization

(other than when acting as an

employer), . ."198 The Indian canon instructs that "statutes are to be construed liberally in favor of Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted
to their benefit,"199 and it requires that congressional abrogations of
sovereignty be "unmistakably clear." 200 The NLRA lacks an "unmistakably
clear" intent to abrogate tribal sovereignty. Furthermore, the NLRA's
193. 523 U.S. 751 (1998).
194. Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 760.
195. Id. at 759.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2000).
199. Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985).
200. County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Nation, 502 U.S. 251,
258 (1992) ("[O]ur cases reveal a consistent practice of declining to find that Congress has
authorized state taxation unless it has 'made its intention to do so unmistakably clear."').
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silence regarding tribes does not effectively establish an intent to impinge
tribal sovereign rights. Rather, statutory silence in interpretive questions
involving Indian tribes often creates ambiguity. 20 1 In such cases, "the
correct presumption is that silence does not work a divestiture of tribal
power."

202

In addition to the NLRA's language, its legislative history and the
broader historical context surrounding its passage also provide no support
for the theory that Congress intended the NLRA to apply to tribes and
divest them of tribal sovereign powers. The NLRA was enacted by
Congress in 1935 to encourage collective bargaining and protect the right of
workers to freedom of association and self-organization. 203 The NLRA's
statement of findings and policy recognizes that "[t]he denial by employers
of the right of employees to organize and the refusal by employers to accept
the procedure of collective bargaining lead to strikes and other forms of
industrial strife or unrest." 204 The NLRA also recognizes in its statement of
findings that the unequal bargaining power between workers and employers
results in the depressing of wage rates and the purchasing power of wage
earners. 205 The NLRA attempts to rectify these problems by creating a
statutory basis for the promotion of collective bargaining. 206 It pronounces,
[i]t is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to
eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free
flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions
when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by
workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and
designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment
or other mutual aid or protection. 207

201. Reich v. Great Lakes Indian Fish & Wildlife Comm'n, 4 F.3d 490, 494 (7th Cir. 1993).
202. NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan, 276 F.3d 1186, 1196 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing Merrion v.
Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 148 n.14 (1982)).
203. The discussion of the NLRA in this article pertains to the NLRA as it was passed in
1935. Although the NLRA was subsequently amended by the Taft-Hartley Act, Pub. L. No. 80101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1982)), and the LaborManagement Reporting and Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959), those
amendments can be characterized more as minor adjustments than substantial modifications of the
original law.
204. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
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Its legislative history provides an even fuller sense of the NLRA's purpose.
This legislative history was largely shaped by Senator Robert F. Wagner of
New York, the legislator who authored the bill and lobbied passionately for
its passage. 208 Wagner's primary concerns as evidenced in statements
attributed to him in the Congressional Record were strengthening the
economy by ensuring that workers could effectively bargain for higher
wages and limiting incidents of workplace disruption by reducing the
number and severity of strikes. 209
The impetus to enact the NLRA also developed from a need to prevent
extreme workplace violence between employers and employees. 210 Senator
Wagner testified that "[tihis toll of private warfare cannot be measured by
statistics alone, for it places the taint of hatred and the stain of bloodshed
21
across the pathway to amicable and profitable business dealings." 1
Outside the halls of Congress during the consideration of Wagner's bill,
employers commonly engaged in practices such as spying on unions,
holding stockpiles of weapons, and employing company police and
strikebreakers to keep employees in line. 212 In some cases, employers
resorted to hiring private "detective companies" who systematically
attempted to silence worker dissent through the use of force and even
murder. 2 13 The passage of the NLRA "shifted the focus of the labor
conflict away from violent confrontation toward the hearing rooms and
courts" by offering workers an enforceable mechanism to collectively
2 14
bargain with employers.
When Congress enacted the NLRA, employment relations in Indian
Country were not on its radar. Congress enacted the NLRA to respond to a

208. Michael J. Heilman, The National Labor Relations Act at Fifty: Roots Revisited, Heart
Rediscovered, 23 DUQ. L. REV. 1059, 1063 (1985).
209. Id. at 1071-72, 1073-74.
210. Id. at 1074 (citing 79 CONG. REC. S7573 (1935) (remarks of Sen. Wagner)).
211. Id.
212. Id. at 1075.
213. John M. Husband, The Colorado Coal Wars of 1913 and 1914: Some Issues Still
Debated Today, 26 COLO. LAW. 147, 149 (1997) (quoting WALTER H. FINK, THE LUDLOW
MASSACRE 75 (1914)). According to contemporary sources,
When the operator saw a strike was inevitable, the Baldwin-Felts Detective Agency
was employed, and hundreds of gunmen and hired assassins, many of whom had
murdered women and children in the West Virginia strike, were brought into the state.
More than a dozen machine guns were purchased and a systematic reign of terror that
has known no equal in history of industrial conflicts was begun by these hired murders
[sic] of John D. Rockefeller.
Id.
214. E. Christi Cunningham, Identity Markets, 45 HOW. L.J. 491, 554 n.405, 557 n.430
(2002)
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growing labor relations crisis in industrial America. 2 15 At no point did
Congress affirm that the NLRA would apply to employment relations in
Indian Country. 2 16 Indeed, no reference was ever made in the NLRA's
legislative history to tribes or tribal employment. 2 17
The broader historical context surrounding the NLRA's passage
strongly supports the conclusion that Congress did not intend for the NLRA
to apply to tribal employment relations. Although legislative history is the
"ultimate source" for determining Congress's purpose in making the law,
the broader historical context of lawmaking is also instructive to show the
conditions that motivate Congress's actions. 218
The broader context of the NLRA's passage in July of 1935 included
the making by Congress of "one of the most significant single pieces of
legislation directly affecting Indians ever enacted by the Congress of the
United States." 2 19 This legislation was the Indian Reorganization Act of
1934 (IRA), also known as the Wheeler-Howard Act. 220 Enacted in June of
1934, the IRA effectively reversed the federal government's Indian affairs
policy by terminating the era of allotment and encouraging greater tribal
2

self-government. 21
Immediately prior to the enactment of the IRA, Congress attempted to
implement a policy of allotting tribally-owned lands to individual tribal
members. This policy was largely implemented through the Dawes General
215. See Local 1976, United Broth. of Carpenters and Joiners of America, A.F.L. v. NLRB,
357 U.S. 93 (1958); see also Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 103 (1954) ("The underlying purpose
of this statute is industrial peace.").
216. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1982) (failing to include Indian tribes in the definition of
"employer").
217. See NLRB. v. Pueblo of San Juan, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1354 (D.N.M. 1998) (citing Sac
& Fox, Indus. Ltd., 307 NLRB 241, 242 (1992)).
218. See Heilman, supra note 208, at 1063-64, stating,
The law is born as a response to secular events, and grows in response to them. If this
were not so we would all still study Blackstone's Commentaries. Congress does not
act sua sponte; it responds to the conditions of the nation. No statute or legislative
discussion makes much sense in the abstract, eviscerated of the events that gave rise to
it. If contemporary economic, social and political events are kept in mind, words on
yellowed pages can become relevant and vital. Studying a statute while ignoring the
events of the day is akin to using a skeleton to study anatomy.
Id.
219. Comment, Tribal Self-Government and the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 70
MICH. L. REV. 955, 955 (1972)
220. Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1934).
221. Id. The allotment era had commenced with the passage of the General Allotment Act of
1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388, codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-358 (1994). The policy of
allotment was the break up of communal ownership of tribal lands through the assignment of
allotments, or parcels of land, to individual tribal members. See id. The allotments issued tribal
members were subject to restrictions on alienation that generally expired after twenty-five years.
Id. § 348. The policy of allotment resulted in the opening up of tribal lands to non-Indian
settlement.
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Allotment Act of 1887.222 The allotment policy had several objectives. 223
It broke up the communally-held tribal land base; encouraged tribal members to adopt a sedentary; agricultural life on individually-held parcels; and
opened tribal lands to non-Indian settlement. 224 The overarching aim of the
allotment era was the forced dissolution of tribes and the assimilation of
Indians into mainstream society. 225
Ultimately, the Dawes Act and its policy of allotment became widely
recognized as a terrible failure.2 26 The Meriam Report of 1928 publicized
the hardships incurred by the loss of the Indian land base and called for
reforms in federal Indian policy. 227 The Commissioner of Indian Affairs,
John Collier, pushed for reforms. 228 He envisioned a new era in which
tribal governments would emerge from pervasive federal control to exercise
their own self-determination. 229 Congress responded by reversing the
course of federal Indian policy through its enactment of the IRA.230
In contrast to allotment, the IRA ushered in a new era of tribal selfgovernance. 23 1 The legislative history of the IRA indicates that Congress's
intent in passing it was "to rehabilitate the Indian's economic life and to
give him a chance to develop the initiative destroyed by a century of
oppression and paternalism." 232 The IRA's first few sections served to
stabilize and strengthen the tribal land base. 233 They prohibited any further
allotment of reservation land, prevented existing allotments from converting
to freely-alienable property by extending their existing trust restrictions,
222. The Dawes General Allotment Act was preceded by several treaties which also sought
to implement allotment on a case-by-case basis with individual tribes. See Treaty with the
Omaha, Mar. 16, 1854, 10 Stat. 1043; Treaty with the Shawnee, May 10, 1854, 10 Stat. 1053;
Treaty with the Sacs and Foxes of Missouri, May 18, 1854, 10 Stat. 1074; Treaty with the
Kickapoo, May 18, 1854, 10 Stat. 1078, Treaty with the Ottawa and Chippewa, July 31, 1855, 11
Stat. 621. The Act was also followed by statutes such as the Curtis Act, ch. 517, 30 Stat. 495
(June 28, 1898), which forced allotment on the Cherokees, Chickasaws, Choctaws, Seminoles,
and Creeks.
223. See generally Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. L. J. 1, 8 (1995).
224. See id.
225. South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998) (citing Hearings on H.R.
7902 before the House Comm. on Indian Affairs, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 428 (1934) (statement of
D.S. Otis on the history of the allotment policy)).
226. See Royster, supra note 223, at 6.
227. See generally INSTITUTE FOR GOVERNMENT RESEARCH, THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN

ADMINISTRATION (Lewis Meriam ed. 1928).
228. See generally Readjustment of Indian Affairs, Hearings on H.R. 7902 Before the House
Committee on Indian Affairs, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
229. Id.
230. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1934).
231. See Singer, supra note 151, at 649-50.
232. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 152 (1973) (quoting H.R. Rep. 1804,
73d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1934)).
233. See Royster, supra note 223, at 17.
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and generally prohibited future transfers of Indian lands, unless the lands
were transferred to the tribe itself. 234 Sections 16 and 17 of the IRA served
as the vehicle for the affirmation of tribal self-government. 235 Under these
provisions, the Secretary of Interior was authorized to approve tribal
constitutions and charters of incorporations for tribes that elected to
organize under the IRA.236
Thus, the IRA's enactment represented the denunciation of the
assimilationist policy of allotment, the adoption of a new policy promoting
tribal self-government, and an attempt by Congress to comprehensively set
out in legislation several measures that defined tribal rights. These aspects
of the IRA serve as an instructive backdrop for interpreting the intent of
legislation subsequently passed by Congress. The need to interpret other
federal laws in light of Congress's contemporaneous statements on Indian
tribes was also underscored by the Supreme Court just three years before
passage of the IRA in the opinion of Choteau v. Burnet.237 In that decision,
the Court addressed whether certain federal tax laws applied to reservation
Indians. 238 The Court opined that since the prevailing Congressional policy
at the time of the enactment of the tax legislation was the assimilation of
Indians and the ultimate conferral of United States citizenship upon them, it
was logical to conclude that the tax was intended to apply. 239
When Congress enacted the NLRA in 1935, it did so on the heels of the
single-most comprehensive piece of legislation ever passed on the subject
of Indian tribes. It also acted in the wake of a Supreme Court decision that
emphasized that laws of general application that were silent regarding
Indians would be interpreted with reference to the prevailing policy of
federal Indian law. Since Congress had so recently and comprehensively

234. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-462, 464 (1934).
235. Id. §§ 476-477.
236. See id. Section 17 of the IRA, which provided for the issuance of a charter of
incorporation to a tribe for business formation, stated,
Such charter may convey to the incorporated tribe the power to purchase, take by gift,
or bequest, or otherwise, own, hold, manage, operate, and dispose of property of every
description, real and personal, including the power to purchase restricted Indian lands
and to issue in exchange therefore interests in corporate property, and such further
powers as may be incidental to the conduct of corporate business, not inconsistent
with law; but no authority shall be granted to sell, mortgage, or lease for a period
exceeding twenty five years any trust or restricted land included in the limits of the
reservation. Any charter so issued shall not be revoked or surrendered except by Act
of Congress.
Id. § 477 (1996).
237. Choteau v. Bumet, 283 U.S. 691, 694 (1931) (finding that whether Indians are exempt
from the tax "requires a reference to the policy of the government with respect to Indians").
238. Id.
239. Id.
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spoken on the subject of Indian tribes, the only reasonable conclusion that
can be made based on the NLRA's failure to encompass tribes within its
regulatory ambit is that Congress never intended the NLRA to apply.
IV. LABOR RELATIONS AND THE EXERCISE OF SOVEREIGNTY
Even if the federal courts and the NLRB continue to find that the
NLRA applies to the on-reservation commercial activities'of tribes, tribes
still have strategies available to continue to exercise self-governance over
tribal labor relations.
A.

RIGHT-TO-WORK ORDINANCES

One successful example of such self-governance is the passage of
"right-to-work" ordinances by tribal governments. Several tribes have recently passed such ordinances, 240 and more are likely to do so in an attempt
to lessen the likelihood that employees will form unions in the wake of the
Board's San Manuel decision.

Right-to-work laws prohibit unions and employers from entering into
agreements that require employees to join and maintain membership in
unions. 241 Such agreements are commonly known as union security agreements and employers that are subject to them are referred to as union shops.
Generally, Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA permits the formation of union
security agreements, 242 but Section 14(b) of the NLRA also permits states
and territories to enact right-to-work laws that prohibit them. 243 In states
that have passed right-to-work laws, employees are entitled to refuse to join

240. See Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians, Resolution #04-22.1446
(Nov. 24, 2004), codified at 8 Grand Traverse Band Code § 801 and 18 Grand Traverse Band
Code § 1701 (on file with author), Blue Lake Rancheria, Ordinance No. 03-03 (June 11, 2003) (on
file with author). See also, NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan, 276 F.3d 1186, 1191 fn. 4 (10th Cir.
2002) (en banc) (noting that the Navajo Nation, Crow Tribe and Osage Tribe have enacted rightto-work ordinances); DAVID KENDRICK, NAT'L INST. FOR LABOR RELATIONS RESEARCH, RIGHT
TO WORK STATES CONTINUE TRADITION OF ECONOMIC GROWTH (June 10, 1998) (noting that the
Seneca-Cayuga Tribe had enacted a right-to-work law), at http://www.nilrr.org/growth.htm.
241. NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan, 276 F.3d 1186, 1190 n.3; see also 8 Grand Traverse Band
Code § 801(a)(2) ("No person shall be required, as a condition of employment on GTB lands,
to... become or remain a member of a labor organization .... ); 18 Grand Traverse Band Code
§ 1701(a)(2) (same).
242. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2000) ("nothing in this subchapter, or in any other statute of the
United States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization...
to require as a condition of employment membership therein on or after the thirtieth day following
the beginning of such employment or the effective date of such agreement, whichever is
later...").
243. Id. § 164(b) ("Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed as authorizing the execution
or application of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of
employment in any State or Territory in which such execution or application is prohibited by State
or Territorial law.")
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a union or pay union dues after beginning work, even if the employees in
the workplace are represented by a union. Thus, right-to-work laws give
employees the option of acting as free riders, since employees can receive
the benefit of union representation in collective bargaining while also
refusing to pay union dues. 244 Perhaps as a result of this free rider
phenomenon, right-to-work laws have been shown to decrease the
likelihood that new organizing activity will take place in the workplace. 245
As of 2004, twenty-three states had enacted right-to-work laws. 246
In National Labor Relations Board v. Pueblo of San Juan,247 the Tenth

Circuit reviewed whether the Pueblo of San Juan had authority to pass a
right-to-work statute that it had enacted, despite the fact that Section 14(b)
of the NLRA does not explicitly permit tribes to pass legislation of this
The district court concluded that the tribe did have this authority. 249
On appeal, the Board argued that the Pueblo's right-to-work ordinance was
preempted by federal law.250 A divided Tenth Circuit panel held that the
NLRA did not preempt the tribal law 251 and an en banc panel of the Tenth
sort. 2 4 8

Circuit affirmed that result, 9-1.252
The holding of Pueblo of San Juan was also acknowledged without
dissent by the NLRB. In reaching its holding in San Manuel, the Board
concluded that Pueblo of San Juan was distinguishable because it did not
involve a claim of complete exemption from the NLRA.253 As a result,
both the NLRB and the Tenth Circuit recognize the authority of tribes to

244. See WILLIAM B. GOULD, A PRIMER ON AMERICAN LABOR LAW 54 (4th ed. 2004).
245. DAVID T. ELLWOOD & GLENN A. FINE, THE IMPACT OF RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS ON
UNION ORGANIZING 32 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. W116, 1983).
246. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 489 (Peter A. Janus et al. eds., 4th ed., supp. 2004).
States with right-to-work laws include Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia and Wyoming. See
id.
247. 280 F.3d 1278 (10th Cir. 2000), aff'd on reh'g, 276 F.3d 1186 (10th Cir. 2002) (en
banc).
248. See Pueblo of San Juan, 280 F.3d at 1281.
249. See id.
250. See id. at 1282.
251. See id. at 1286.
252. See NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan, 276 F.3d 1186, 1200 (10th Cir.).
253. See San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino, 341 NLRB No. 138, 2004 WL 1283584, at *6
n. 16 ("Moreover, the facts of Pueblo of San Juan are distinguishable. There, the Board sought
declaratory and injunctive relief to challenge a right-to-work ordinance enacted by the tribe. Here,
the Respondent seeks to avoid the application of the Act to its commercial activities."). The
Board's statement in this quote neglects the fact that San Manuel also involved an indirect
challenge to a tribal ordinance, since the San Manuel had enacted a Tribal Labor Relations
Ordinance that conflicted with the NLRA.
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pass right-to-work laws, and the right has not been challenged in any other
circuit.
Pueblo of San Juan possesses significance for tribes for two reasons.
First and most obviously, the opinion creates a window of opportunity for
tribes to exercise some degree of self-governance in the employment
relations context. By recognizing that tribes have the prerogative to make
decisions about whether to permit union shops, the opinion allows tribes to
take ownership over an important aspect of labor relations. Rather than
fully relinquishing tribal regulatory control over labor relations to the
NLRB, the Pueblo of San Juan decision creates a window for tribes to
assess labor relations needs, weigh policy options and enact and implement
laws that attempt to resolve those needs. These actions are all part of the
effective operation of self-governance and part of the means toward
254
achieving self-determination as well.
Second, the rationale of Pueblo of San Juan is significant because it
affirms the foundational principles of Indian law, 255 it applies the Indian
canon of construction to its interpretation of the NLRA,256 and it places the
burden of proving that Congress has abrogated tribal sovereign powers
squarely on the Board.257 In addition, the court distinguishes Federal
Power Commission v. Tuscarora on the basis that Tuscarora merely
involved issues of ownership, and did not involve the divestment of tribal
sovereign powers.2 58 The court's analysis ultimately leads it to conclude
that "Congress'[s] silence as to the tribes can hardly be taken as an affirmative divestment of their existing 'general authority, as sovereign[s], to
259
control economic activity' on territory within their jurisdictions."
B.

NEW DIRECTIONS FOR REGULATING TRIBAL LABOR RELATIONS

The likely outcome of the San Manuel and Pueblo of San Juan
decisions is that tribes will attempt to minimize the threat of unionization
by passing right-to-work statutes. Although this strategy allows tribes to
254. See Pueblo of San Juan, 280 F.3d at 1200 ("The legislative enactment of the Pueblo's
right-to-work ordinance was also clearly an exercise of sovereign authority over economic
transactions on the reservation.").
255. See id. at 1192 (linking Worcester v. Georgia to the principle that tribes retain their
existing sovereign powers until Congress acts).
256. See id. at 1194 ("In the absence of clear evidence of congressional intent, therefore,
federal law will not be read as stripping tribes of their retained sovereign authority to pass rightto-work laws and be governed by them.").
257. See id. at 1190 ("The burden falls on the NLRB and the Union, as plaintiffs attacking
the exercise of sovereign tribal power, to 'show that it has been modified, conditioned or divested
by Congressional action').
258. See id. at 1198-99.
259. See id. at 1198 (quoting Merrion v. JicarillaApache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137 (1982)).
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exercise some degree of self-governance over labor relations, this strategy
is at bottom a reactive and insufficient approach that will thwart the ability
of tribes to develop more progressive and comprehensive labor policies that
satisfy the specific needs of tribal communities.
First, the passage of right-to-work ordinances is insufficient because it
serves as an inferior substitute for the implementation of comprehensive
tribal labor policies. Those tribes that pass right-to-work ordinances are
quite possibly driven by the fear that employees will form unions in the
wake of the San Manuel decision, and they look to right-to-work '-rdinances
as a form of insurance against union activity. The problem with this
approach is that right-to-work ordinances do not insure against unions, but
merely reduce the likelihood of new organizing activity.2 60 In addition, the
passage of a right-to-work ordinance is essentially defensive. Once confronted with the threat of NLRA enforcement, tribes are forced to divert
their attention away from the pursuit of a vision for community labor
relations that may in fact embrace unions and promote organizing activity

but impose restrictions on bargaining tactics where the employer provides
essential public services. 261

The passage of right-to-work ordinances is also insufficient because it
permits tribes to be treated like states for the purposes of the power to enact
right-to-work statutes, but it denies tribes other privileges granted states
under the law. Most obvious, of course, is the fact that states are exempt
from the definition of "employer" under the NLRA. If tribal sovereignty
interests are sufficient to support the authority to enact right-to-work
statutes, the same sovereignty interests should also support the authority of
tribes to enact tribal labor laws that govern public employment.
In addition, tribes should press for the right to assume jurisdiction over
labor disputes, just as Sections 10 and 14(c)(2) of the NLRA permit states
to assume such jurisdiction. 262 Unions, employees, and employers could all
260. ELLWOOD & FINE, supra note 245, at 32.
261. There are many reasons to believe that tribal labor policy would differ in significant
ways from the standards of the NLRA if tribes had the freedom to legislate in this area. Since
tribally-owned commercial enterprises provide revenues that fund public services, tribes have an
interest in maintaining revenue flows and restricting business interruptions. Much like the states
and the federal government, tribes must ensure that the collective bargaining process does not
jeopardize the continued provision of essential public services. For this reason, a tribal labor
policy may include restrictions on the unfettered right to strike or restrictions on the subject
matters eligible for collective bargaining.
262. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (2000) provides that,
the Board is empowered by agreement with any agency of any State or Territory to
cede to such agency jurisdiction over any cases in any industry (other than mining,
manufacturing, communications, and transportation except where predominantly local
in character) even though such cases may involve labor disputes affecting commerce,
unless the provision of the State or Territorial statute applicable to the determination
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benefit immensely by tribal assumption of jurisdiction over labor disputes.
The NLRB averages 747 days-more than two years-to conclude a case
263 For an employee
from the date of the filing of the charge to the decision.
wrongfully discharged who must continue to make mortgage and car
payments, this delay virtually ensures that damages will be paid long after
264 Some tribes have
the house is foreclosed and the car repossessed.
relatively small dockets and could adjudicate labor disputes in a more
efficient and streamlined process.2 65 Where appropriate, tribes could also
offer parties the option of resolving their disputes in traditional dispute
resolution forums. Several tribes operate traditional dispute resolution
forums that have substantial benefits, including greater cultural relevance
for the parties, 266 more efficient processes, and increased success at cooperative problem solving. Such traditional dispute resolution forums pose
significant advantages in comparison to more adversarial processes that
tend to polarize and entrench the parties.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Board's decision to apply the NLRA to San
Manuel's gaming operation rests on an analysis that departs with Supreme
Court precedent and congressional policy. The Board's decision also perpetuates a pattern of adoption of the Tuscarora-Coeurd'Alene approach,
despite the fact that the approach also departs from existing doctrine. If the
courts and the Board continue their use of the rule, they will minimize and
trivialize tribal sovereignty on a case-by-case, ad hoc basis, resulting in the
slow erosion of recognized tribal rights. The best weapon that tribes can
deploy in response to this pattern is the continued exercise of sovereign
powers through the enactment, implementation and enforcement of tribal

of such cases by such agency is inconsistent with the corresponding provision of this
subchapter or has received a construction inconsistent therewith.
Id. § 164(c)(2) (2000) provides that,
[nlothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to prevent or bar any agency or the courts
of any State or Territory (including the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the
Virgin Islands), from assuming and asserting jurisdiction over labor disputes over
which the Board declines ... to assert jurisdiction.
263. See GOULD, supra note 244, at 132.
264. Id.
265. Kevin K. Washburn & Chloe Thompson, A Legacy of Public Law 280: Comparing and
ContrastingMinnesota's New Rule for the Recognition of Tribal CourtJudgments with the Recent
Arizona Rule, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 479, 522 (2004) (contrasting the 50,000 cases on the
Navajo Nation's docket each year with the small docket of many Minnesota tribes).
266. Robert F. Porter, Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty Through Peacemaking: How the
Anglo-American Legal Tradition Destroys Indigenous Societies, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
235, 250-51 (1997).
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legislation such as right-to-work laws, public employment labor relations
laws, and procedures for the transfer and assumption of jurisdiction over
tribal labor disputes.

